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We must learn to look
Our mistakes squarely in the face
Lest we fall into repeating them.
- Rui Baltasar Santos
Former Finance Minister, Mozambique
A Luta Continual (The struggle continues)
- Mozambican Mobilizing Theme
Introduction
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world with GDP per capita 
estimates of $150 to $100. It has one of the highest ratios of absolute 
poverty to population at nearly 60% (and up to two-thirds rural and 
refugee). Over 1971 - 1985 it saw its per capita output fall by over half 
before a limited 1986-90 recovery. National food availability shortfall is 
probably 30%. It is one of the most war devastated countries in recorded 
history and the resultant losses of output and life continue and menace the 
peace which is being won, because investment and maintenance not made or 
destroyed, like a decade of blocked health service improvement, are not 
restored by the ending of (to date drastic reduction in) the targeted 
sabotage and mass terrorism which caused them. In addition the personnel 
capacity of the public service is very low (as is the overall size of its 
civilian component); total non-military and non-emergency survival by the 
state are about 36% of World Bank 'Long Term Perspective Study' norms; and 
the ways "donors" and "cooperants" operate is steadily decapitating the 
government both as to personnel and as to ability to analyse, select, 
coordinate or monitor policy and performance.
Professor Green wishes to stress that although he is Acting Senior 
Social Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Planning of Mozambique and has 
served as Consultant to the Ministry of Finance of Mozambique, the 
responsibility for the views and analysis on this paper are his. They 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Mozambique, of 
UNICEF, of the World Bank or of ODA.
2Table 1
Rough Basic Data; Mozambique
1971 1973-74 1976 1980 1986
A.
B.
GDP/Capita (Index) 100 90 80 85 45
Food Balance (tonnes-grain equivalent) 1980 1990
Required* 4,750,000 5,250,000
Produced 4,000,000 3,000,000
Imported 150,000 650,000
Deficit 600,000 1,600,000
(12|%) (30%)
1990
50
C.
For national 100% of minimum standard calorie requirement. 
Assumes 10% growth people in Mozambique over decade.
Population 1990
High
Adjusted'
In Mozambique
15.000.000
14.000.000
Refugees
1.250.000
1.250.000
Total
16.250.000
15.250.000
For 1,000,000 "excess" deaths related to war.
D. GDP/Capita 1990
* $ 150
Ad hoc adjustment to inconsistent valuation (in Mt) of domestic 
especially household self-provisioning - output. With no such 
adjustment World Bank estimates at $ 100.
3Table 2
Cost of War 1980 - lgSS1
A. GDP ($ 000,000 at 1988 Prices)
1988 1980-88
Lost GDP2 
Actual GDP2 
Ratio Lost To Actual 
Ratio Lost To Non-War3
3,000
2,250
133%
57%
15.000
21.0001 
71% 
42%
1 Methodology in sources cited.
2 Very serious calculation and conversion to $ problems arise 
because of state of Mozambican national accounts and trajectory 
of exchange rate.
3 Non-War GDP estimated as in sources cited.
4 Methodology in sources cited. Contrasts actual Infant and 
Under 5 Mortality with probable levels had war not reversed 
1975-1980 primary-mother-child health care build-up.
5 Source lumps malnutrition related/famine plus vaccination at
175,000. Other health service destruction related very rough 
estimate of 31,000.
5 Mozambican estimates of 100,000 for 1975-85 and Gersoney Report 
(USA) for 100,000 roughly over 1983/87 based on interviews with 
refugees are both overlapping and incomplete. 1986-88 deaths 
are clearly underestimated and represent a period of intense 
fighting and bandidos terrorism. A tentative total of 175,000 
to 180,000 civilian and 20,000 to 25,000 combatant deaths is 
probably realistic.
Sources Used:
UNICEF, Children On The Front Line, New York, 1989.
UN Economic Commission for Africa/lnter-Agency Task Force Africa
Recovery Programme, South African Destabilisation: The Economic Cost
of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid, Addis Ababa/New York, 1989.
B. Lives4 1980-88
Infants/Young Children 
Other Health Related5 
Famine5
Direct/Indirect War Casualties5 
Total
494.000 
56,000
150.000
2 0 0 . 0 0 0  
900,000
4That is a grim summary but not an exaggerated one. Without a recognition 
of these basic contextual facts almost any prioritisation and action 
selection is likely to be grossly impracticable or to have quite unexpected 
(not necessarily unpredictable) results. It is not to be taken as advice 
to treat Mozambique as a case to be excluded from treatment on triage 
grounds for five reasons:
1. No such option is open to Mozambicans;
2. Mozambique has demonstrated a great determination to survive and to 
make its "dream" of liberation and progress to modest prosperity live 
and that will has to date prevailed even if many Mozambicans have 
perished;
3. Despite its material and personnel weaknessess - and one of the world's 
least able to act bureaucracies - Mozambique has achieved initial 
successes in rehabilitation and reconstruction (including 4% to 6% 
annual post 1985 food production and GDP growth rates) and has more 
dynamic national political and social processes than many other 
countries;
4. Mozambicans are well aware of the decapacitating impact of "donors" and 
"cooperants" ("doadores" and "cooperantes" in Portuguese often have a 
sardonic ring as pronounced in Maputo); have a strong will to regain 
freedom of manoeuvre and a record of using logic and diplomacy to good 
effect externally even when their objective base from which to bargain 
has been very weak;
5. The war against the bandidos armados who call themselves Renamo has 
from the end of 1987, increasingly been being won - peace is a prospect 
which requires programming if new needs and problematics are not to 
overwhelm the potentially tremendous gains from renewed security and 
reduced war costs.
What is clear is that neither restoring 1980 and "The Plan of all our 
dreams" or the 1971 high noon of Portugal's "Provincia de Mozambique" is 
either practicable or desirable. Many subsequent changes - at home and 
abroad - are irreversible and, in any event, the dynamics of 1971 and, to a 
lesser degree and in different ways, 1980 were fatally flawed. But 
"stabilisation" by cutting back offers no way to regain a base for a new
5start nor does "structural adjustment" of the type moderately successful 
(at least for 5 to 10 years) in less davastated countries/economies such as 
Ghana. Radical restructuring with a focus on rehabilitation of the 
livelihoods and social units of the directly war dislocated and other 
absolutely poor families is almost certainly essential to macroeconomic, 
political or social stability and growth. If it cannot be achieved 
Mozambique economically will remain what its macro external account, fiscal 
and food data tell us it is today - a broken body insecurely hooked to a 
life support machine drifting into and out of coma. Unfortunately such a 
priority requires reorganising government services, planning and 
capital/recurrent interactions in ways very difficult for colonial or post­
colonial traditions, habits of outlook and patterns of action of the public 
service (or the world view plus practices of "donors" and "cooperants") to 
adapt themselves.
A Brief Historical Backdrop
r
Mozambique's economy has been shaped by Portugal; by the nature of the 
transition to independence; by the war of aggression organised and driven 
by South Africa over 1981-90 and by the perceptions, prognostications and 
priorities of its external sources of finance. There is a very real sense 
in which - except for 1977-80 - Mozambican input has always been a 
resistance or liberation movement.
Mozambique's colonial political economy was until the late 1950s largely a 
seller of services - transport, labour and tourism (and after 1970 
electricity) - to its South African, Rhodesian and Nyassaland neighbouring 
economies. Only over 1955-70 did Portugal find the resources and 
priorities to build up settler production (partly to enhance security by 
raising the white population) and secondary industry. Despite a near total 
lack of public services to (as opposed to exactions from) sector familial 
(peasant) agriculture, it provided up to two-thirds of agricultural exports 
and up to a half of commercialised food production. Education and health 
for black Mozambicans were exiguous up to the day of independence even by 
colonial standards.
The transition to independence was marked by the rapid exodus of 90% of the 
Portuguese ancestry residents of Mozambique - leaving most posts from
6locomotive drivers, crane operators, mechanics and secretaries on vacant. 
Further, the Portuguese post Caetano state nationalised nearly everything 
in sight vaguely telling Mozambique to take over any bits which happened to 
be there.
The priorities of the first years were to maintain key operations, to 
prevent the collapse of the modern sector (including plantation and ex­
settler agriculture) and to lay the base for broad access health, education 
and water services. The huge, centralised state enterprise sector was 
initially pragmatic - to collect abandoned units, the spin offs of 
Portuguese nationalisations and the mismanaged or ripped off private firms 
heavily indebted to Mozambican banks. In general centralisation related to 
economising on very limited numbers of high level personnel. The 
rationalisation toward a particular form of socialism, industry centrism, 
large scale enterprise, urban focus, and modernisation was initially a 
gloss on pragmatic crisis management and only time (and GDR "cooperants" - 
plus Nordic, and other, aid bureaucracies) turned it into an articulated 
rhetoric and continuing practice toward implementing Frelimo's goals (or at 
least toward attempting their implementation).
Over 1977-80 the pragmatic crisis management paid off. Most services and 
enterprises ran and output recovered, ultimately at 5% a year. The cost of 
the rationalisation of pragmatism into rigid principles - and of never 
launching a systematic retraining (remedial training) programme for serving 
public personnel - were not fully visible while the wear and tear of 
deferred physical and institutional maintenance had not reached (or been 
seen to reach) crisis point. The 1980-90 Plan was over-ambitious 
(especially as to institutional and personnel resources), over-centralised 
and lacked any real sector familial component. Whether its reasonably well 
handled basic goals could have been held to; its aberrations eroded and its 
gaps filled had peace and a 5% growth rate continued, will be forever 
arguable. Mozambicans had begun to see the snags and contradictions; a 
remarkable range of "cooperants" were de facto more dogmatically and 
rigidly Mozambican than the Mozambicans - and often more influential.
In the event, RSA's "total strategy" had a Mozambican face of total 
onslaught via selective sabotage and mass terrorism. It tore economy, 
society and polity power to carry out civilian functions into shreds. 
Survival and crisis limitation became central - and often surprisingly
7successful given the context. Decentralisation (because of wrecked 
communications) and sector familial agriculture (partly because the 
resources to protect and operate large scale were gone) were in principle 
given high emphasis albeit lack of resources and safe access to much of the 
countryside limited both and made sector familial support outside peri 
urban Zonas Verdes virtually a dead letter. Again pragmatic adjustment to 
crisis preceded rationalisation - or adumbrating of new sets of principles.
By 1985/86 Mozambique was on the verge of economic, civil government and 
(for the war dislocated) human survival collapse. Diplomatic, publicity 
and negotiating initiatives raised massive soft resources from 1986/87 
onward. These did underwrite survival, halt overall economic decline and - 
unevenly - halt erosion of government service provision. As they carried 
detailed policy prescriptions and detailed takeover of operations in 
Mozambique by foreigners, they did not self-evidently increase Mozambican 
capacity to prioritize, select, coordinate and as often hampered as speeded 
Mozambique's own strategy and policy reform process.
t
Poverty in Mozambique
A priority for poverty reduction began to appear in Mozambican strategy 
from 1985/86. Presumably it is the only Structural Adjustment Programme 
ever to open with the stated goal of restoring broad based domestic demand 
to justify restoration, rehabilitation and expansion of production.
However, until 1988/89 that priority remained relatively unfocused and its 
macro effective demand/production and emergency survival/basic services 
components were rarely seen as complementary, much less planned together. 
Oddly a coherent Mozambican formulation and prioritisation process seems to 
have been catalysed by and interacted with the Bank's emerging (and 
initially virtually as unclear and unsystematic) Social Dimensions of 
Adjustment Programme.The bottom line reasons were that unless poor was 
tightly defined 95% or more of Mozambicans were poor - a somewhat 
unsatisfactory focus because of its very all inclusiveness - and that data 
on the parameters of poverty was fragmentary, micro or qualitative, at best 
approximate and hard to fit into a coherent pattern.
8Table 3
Poverty in Mozambique
Category
Urban
% Absolute 
Poverty
Number 
Absolutely Poor Population
25-45%* (535,000
(964,000
2,141,575
Sub-Urban 40-50%* (183,000
(275,000
457,960
Urban Subtotal 30-50%* (720,000
(1,339,000
2,599,000
Peri-Urban 40-60%2 (477,000
(715,000
1,191,684
Urban/Peri-Urban 33-57% (1,298,000
(2,051,000
3,597,000
Displaced 
Severely Affected 
Other Rural
100%3
80%^
50%5
1.690.000
2.587.000
3.405.000
1,690,000
2,874,700
6,809,239
Rural-Excl.Peri-Urban 68% 7,682,000 11,374,000
Rural Total 65-67% (8,159,000
(8,397,000
12,567,000
Mozambique Total 59-64% (8,879,000 15,166,000
Refugees 100%3 1,200,000 1,200,000
Mozambicans Total 62-67% (10,089,000
(10,936,000
16,366,000
30 to 50% range estimated from Maputo and Tete Household surveys. 30% is possible early 1989 
improvement following increase in minimum wage of about one third promulgated as of November 1988.
50% in mid-1988 position as surveyed. Sub-urban areas treated as somewhat poorer than urban poorer.
Rural residents purchasing food from Ministry of Commerce system. Partly standard peri-urban and 
partly ex-full scale farmers huddled in security zones. Low hectarage for cultivation and limited 
other sources of income.
Not all displaced persons and refugees have high rates of malnutrition or lack of access to health 
and education. But many do and in terms of other consumption and of income or the possibility of 
earning it virtually all are absolutely poor.
4
These are households which in general have lost almost all assets and have low levels of or 
opportunity for earned income like displaced persons some have fairly good nutrition levels from food 
aid and access to basic health and education.
5
Conservative estimate based on other low income African countries. Probably higher as in fact 
includes isolated and bandit enslaved households who are virtually all absolutely poor.
Source: A Pobreza em Mozambique, Prime Minister's Office, Maputo 1989
(Working Team Report written by R. H. Green)
9With the 1988/89 exercise leading to A Pobreza em Mozambique the initial 
elements of a map, a focus, an articulation and a set of potential 
instruments have begun to emerge. Absolute poverty (roughly the 
income/expenditure level over 60% of which would be needed to provide a 
minimum nutritionally and calorifically adequate diet and avert high levels 
of infant and young child growth faltering) entraps over 60% of all 
Mozambicans and about 60% of Mozambicans in Mozambique.
Urban was 25% before early 1988 and probably again since mid 1989, with a 
sharp rise to nearly 50% in mid 1988 related to mis-projected results of 
policy reforms and their late 1988 adjustment almost immediately that 
approximate urban poverty data came to hand. Peri-urban absolute poverty 
is clearly higher, but a range of 40 to 60% is almost a pure guess because 
food production by peri urban households (which as defined include 
estate/state farm employees) and effective availability of "fair price" 
basic food supplies is both very uneven and at any aggregated level 
virtually "terra incognita".
Rural absolute poverty (in Mozambique) was estimated at about two thirds. 
This was made up of 100% for deslocados (displaced and in camps), 90% for 
affectados (displaced, usually only nominally resettled, much less well 
served by Emergencia than deslocados) and 50% for "other" rural households 
(many of whom are pauperised but in their home areas or either - as of 1988 
- under bandit control and isolated). Later rural surveys showed over two 
thirds growth faltering for a rather random (in the wrong sense) sample 
handled by very unusual procedures which should have been broadly "other" 
rural households. This suggests the two thirds overall estimate may be too 
low.
Refugees were characterised as 100% absolutely poor. This may not be 
literally true for those with some access to livelihood abroad but - except 
under very favourable logistic, climatic and relative linkage conditions - 
is likely to pertain on their return.
The conclusion was not that poor and not so poor households should be 
ignored, but that poverty reduction strategy should be oriented toward the 
absolutely poor majority. Categorising the latter is either relatively 
easy or infinitely complex depending on detail sought.
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For urban about 90% of the absolutely poor households fall in the 20% to 
25% which do not have a salario (recorded wage employment) and about 90% of 
those households are absolutely poor. The other 10% almost all have a 
single low level salario, limited informal income and above average family 
size. The minimum wage has since 1986 been held to a purchasing power 
about equal to two thirds of the absolute poverty line for a 5 to 7 person 
household and second incomes - usually self provisioning, 'informal' wages 
or micro enterprise - can in most households bridge that gap unless there 
is a high dependency ratio. The non-salario households are largely female 
headed, disabled person headed or (and) aged person headed.
For "other" rural households the key characteristics appear to be access to 
enough usable land to grow food; access to commercial network to sell 
produce (food or other); non-farm cash (earned or remittance) income; 
access to basic health services; degree of security. With some exceptions 
these currently tend to be more location (sometimes quite small location) 
determined than related to household characteristics. However, fragmentary 
observations suggest female headed and high dependency ratio households 
(overlapping categories but not identical) are more likely to exist in 
absolute poverty - especially in districts with relatively good security.
Poverty Reduction Strategy
From this preliminary poverty/absolute poverty mapping has come a renewed 
commitment to allocating priority attention to absolute poverty reduction 
as a central theme in main government policies, programmes and resource 
allocations. But with it has come an awareness that the present pattern of 
all three is structurally warped if poverty reduction is a strategic 
priority and that many donors, bureaucrats and politicians neither 
understand the nature of poverty in Mozambique, how it could be reduced nor 
what changes that would entail. Many in a serious sense do not share the 
commitment, at least not if acting on it is inconvenient or expensive for 
them.
Strategically absolute poverty reduction has come to be seen as resting on
three pillars:
enabling poor (and not so poor) households to produce more;
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2. providing growing (toward universal) access to basic health, education 
and water human investment services as well as more directly 
productivity oriented extension (agricultural and other) ones plus 
micro infrastructural rehabilitation;
3. ensuring survival ("safety nets") for those persons and households 
temporarily or permanently unable to participate in the first or 
benefit fully from the second.
The first pillar is seen as the most important; but also is the least 
understood or - except at a superficial verbal level - accepted by 
bureaucrats, professionals, the "doadores" or the World Bank. Basic 
services, rural development extension, labour intensive infrastructure 
rehabilitation, emergency survival and, even, "safety nets" have far wider 
support bases which do relate to articulated (if often far from adequate) 
programmes. The concept of production by poor people as a (not the, a) 
central organising principle for economic policy and action, not as a 
string of add on, marginal, afterthought projects, has no such core 
consistency, articulated approach set or asserted (and status conferring 
whatever the accuracy or generality of the assertions) track record.
An emerging Mozambican view is that enabling poor households to produce 
more requires:
a. conversion of Emergencia into Rehabilitacao now that growing security 
makes that possible;
b. conversion of donor designed and driven, capital - expatriate - import 
intensive, project focussed rural activity to broad access, simple 
package, Mozambican designed and driven (with serious sector familial 
input and continued donor fuelling) as very tentatively illustrated in 
the drafts toward a Priority District Programme;
c. restructuring planning away from its modified Colonial Shopping 
List/simplified GDR central plan/World Bank Priority Public Investment 
Programme focus on bricks and mortar to overall coordination of 
recurrent - capital - rehabilitation - survival resource allocations 
linked to testing them against objectives and results;
d. shaping macro economic and sectoral policy to focus on employment 
creation as well as cost reduction and output expansion (with special
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attention - if means can be identified - to the artisanal and micro 
enterprise urban analogue to the sector familial).
The services steps are more evident and more readily draw on Mozambican and 
other experience. But the training/retraining/knowledge creation- 
collection-development barriers are massive and not readily surmounted 
rapidly nor by the efforts of a few people. This is particularly true of 
Education whose glossy model hides a near total absence of pedagogical or 
staff training articulation (or perhaps even prioritisation), as well as of 
remedial, in service and specialised user oriented training and also 
implies a continued rapid decline in rural enrolment. Nor - despite 
successful and recognised examples - is labour intensive public works 
likely to prove easy to generalise nor to structure to maximise seasonal 
hiring of sector familial household members.
Safety net limits are seen to be financial, logistical and administrative. 
Emergencia does - by and large - limit deaths and (less uniformly) avert 
squalor in the lives of war displaced people. The urban "fair price" 
(basically non-subsidised) ration system provides a subsidy of 20% to 25% 
of absolute poverty line requirements in Maputo and Beira albeit its 
effectiveness without a ration registration system in other urban centres 
is far less. Experiments with additional targeted schemes show commitment 
and ingenuity but may become bogged in bureaucratic inability to cope - 
e.g. category specific income supplements - and/or logistical mechanics -
e.g. yellow maize as a subsidised, self selected, "non-preferred" staple.
Expenditure: Levels and Makeup
Mozambique's government expenditure is demonstrably too high, too low and 
too ill structured to be effective either in achieving development or 
reducing absolute poverty. The difficulty is not in reaching these 
conclusions but in identifying ways out of that straight-jacket before it 
becomes a coffin.
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Table 4
Broad Government/Public Utility spending: 
Mozambique 1990 vs World Bank LTPS 'Norms'
A. B. C.
Mozambique
(
LTPS1
$ 000,000) Ill
Emergency 350 (100)2 350%
Defence 225 (50) 450%
Other Recurrent 325 900 36%
Total Recurrent 550 950 61%
Capital 375 1050 36%
Total 12753 2100 61%
Per Capita $ 85 $ 140 61%
1 For 15,000,000 Population
2 ( ) are interpolated estimates for sectors for which LTPS
does not provide specific targets but - implicitly - 
assumes will exist at some level.
3 Not comparable to formal budgets because of incomplete 
bringing to budget of external finance. Also not 
comparable to Total Domestic Resources plus Total Aid 
because of approximate exclusion of Technical Assistance 
paid to donor's nationals not entering Mozambique 
national/external accounts ($ 200-300 million).
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Restructured Public Spending
Possible To 1995*
($ 000,000 - 1990 prices)
Table 4A
Mozambique LTPS %
1995 Norm M/LTP!
Emergency 100 (117) 86%
Rehabilitation 250 — -
Other Capital 500 - -
Total Capital 750 1225 61%
Defence 120 (60) 200%
Other Recurrent 560 1050 53%
Total Recurrent 680 1110 61%
Total 1530 2450 62%
Alt. Capital*" 500 1225 41%
Alt. Other Recurrent** 830 1050 79%
Per Capita $87 $140 62%
Assumes 5% annual growth domestic and external revenue and 4.5% 
resident population growth (including refugee return).
Transfers Rehabilitation to Recurrent Totals.
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Government expenditure - Emergencia, Capital and Recurrent in Mozambique is 
of the order of $1,275 million as of 1990. Of that roughly $900 million is 
externally provided (including counterpart funds) and $375 domestic (70% - 
30% respectively). Balance fiscally and operationality physically depend 
on annual fluctuations in external pledges and pipeline flows. Prospects 
for rapid real increases in external support are poor and there is a danger 
of emergency funding declining with no parallel increase in rehabilitation, 
recurrent or capital funding. The $85 per capita in the three budgets 
amounts to well over 50% of GDP estimated at $150 per capita for a resident 
population of 15,000,000. On that basis the expenditure is unsustainably 
high.
It is unsustainably low in contrast to the $140 per capita annual 
requirement derivable from the World Bank's Long Term Perspective Study 
adjusted to include rather low estimates for the sectors (including general 
administration, defence and police and debt service) for which it makes no 
specific estimates of requirements. Mozambique's 61% of the per capita 
norm could be argued to be just adequate: the calculations are a late
1990s target and are global for SSA at average per capita GDP.
Unfortunately the probability of rapid growth in Mozambique per capita 
state expenditure to 1995 is low and the bulk of the LTPS' priority items 
in respect to basic services, agriculture and infrastructure have minimum 
costs which simply cannot be cut to match lower GDP per capita if initial 
wages and salaries are at low real levels.
More crucial, the 61% overall achievement of the LTPS norms is very 
misleading. For emergency survival Mozambique (necessarily as Emergencia 
is demonstrably too ill funded and equipped to cover all those needing its 
support) is 350% of the norm, while Defence is of the order of 450% (again 
demonstrably necessarily to date). Capital and Other Recurrent spending 
are only 36% of the LTPS targets - a level beyond doubt too low whatever 
case could be made for the adequacy of 61%.
The highest plausible annual real growth rate for domestic and external 
real revenues/transfers over the next five years is 5%. That would raise 
the total to $87 per capita or 62% - assuming peace allows a massive return 
of refugees and, therefore, a 4% to 4.5 % growth of population in 
Mozambique. Evidently structural transformation of expenditure is
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essential. With rapidly improving security prospects and realities it is 
also possible.
Emergencia annual expenditure can be cut from $350 million to $100 million 
if - and without mass pauperisation and large scale loss of life only if - 
$250 million can be translated to "Rehabilitacao" to enable war dislocated 
to restore their livelihoods. That does square with 1987-1989 average 
Emergencia pledges, but not with the pitiful $150 million total of 1990.
And it assumes donors will loosen the apparent slogan of disaster/survival 
wings ("Disaster is our bread and butter" as one well-intentioned official 
put it in a not dissimilar context) to allow emergency survival support to 
broaden into restoring survivors' ability to produce and/or rehabilitation 
following and reversing disaster is accepted as a part of "normal 
development assistance" together with project, programme, sectoral and 
import support finance. To date that is not happening in the case of 
Mozambique.
Defence spending - on reasonable prognostications as to the road to peace - 
can (indeed needs to be for specific defence force related reasons) be cut 
about 50% with the domestic resources saved in that "peace dividend" re­
allocated to basic services and agriculture in the Recurrent Budget.
These shifts would allow Non-Defence Recurrent spending to rise to 79% of 
LTPS norms including (53% excluding) Rehabilitation and Capital to 41% 
excluding (and 61% including) Rehabilitation. That begins to be a set of 
spending parameters which could begin to be viable in terms of output 
enhancement and poverty reduction.
However it requires recasting the balance between Capital and Recurrent 
external support and - probably much harder - to recast it away from the 
isolated capital-expatriate-import intensive project syndrome to goal and 
policy related, Mozambican input intensive programmes. These two shifts 
have formal verbal support from a number of donors but - especially in 
respect to Capital programme recasting - much less evidence of actual 
shifts. And Mozambican technocrats symbiotically linked to donor 
professionals and the general weakness of state service capacity create an 
inertial tendency to crank out more and more "big projects".
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The Mozambican Public Service: A Trio of Conundrums
The Mozambican civilian public service is too small, too inadequately 
trained and too ill paid to perform minimum levels of essential services at 
acceptable standards of quality and breadth of access to customers (or tax­
payers or citizens). At the same time the budgetary wage and salary bill 
of perhaps $50-60 million for civilian employees is barely financeable now.
Mozambique's total public service of about 200,000 is roughly at IMF 
calculations of the norm for a very low income country of 15 million 
population. Its civilian public service of 105,000 to 110,000 is between 
60 and 63% of the normal size. Within it the makeup relative to a rough 
Anglophone SSA distribution pattern is even more striking with Education 
and Health 73% to 90% of the typical range but all other sectors in the 35% 
to 50% range. This appears to include General Administration contrary to 
the rather erroneous (whimsical when viewed from inside the governmental 
apparatus) view that Mozambique is "over-administered".
It is quite valid to argue that 20,000 odd present posts (mostly at low 
support service levels) could usefully be eliminated. The number of 
presently unqualified post holders is probably 50,000 to 60,000 (excluding 
holders of superfluous posts) of whom perhaps 10,000 cannot be trained and 
need to be retrenched - in the public, including the absolutely poor 
majority, interest, if not in their own as a very vulnerable group. But at 
a rough guess 30,000 new civilian posts plus massive (40,000 to 50,000?) 
upgrading training are needed by 1995 (and are not systematically 
identified or articulated to date) so that net spending increases net 
savings are needed even at present real pay levels.
The real pay levels are inefficient. Especially at the bottom end they do
not allow - much less motivate - workers to work full time or hard. They 
have to earn second incomes to survive. And, especially at the top end, 
they are so low ($150 to $200 a month) as to lead both to loss of morale 
and to loss of the best personnel. Ironically at the very top the chief 
"winners" are aid agencies, who via direct hirings, private Mozambican 
consultants and "topping up" civil servants' pay to buy their time for the
toppers' - not the governments' - priorities, are rapidly decapacitating 
the Mozambican government and public service.
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Stylized Public Service Employment - Lo Income SSA/Mozambique
Table 5
1 Norm' Mozambicrue
Total Civilian1 175,000 - 200,000 105,000 - 110,000
Education 40,000 - 50,000 55,000Health 20,000 - 25,000
Works2 20,000 - 30,000 -
Agriculture3 15,000 - 20,000 -
Water4 5,000 - 10,000 -
General Admin. 30,000 - 40,000 (20,000)
Interior5 20,000 - 25,000 (5,000)
Other6 20,000 - 40,000 (25,000 - 30,000)
Armed Forces2 25,000 100,000
Grand Total 200,000 - 225-000 205,000 - 210,000
1 Includes (nominally) strictly civilian police. Very hard to 
identify in practice.
2 Includes govt, construction/maintenance capacity which may be 
listed under housing or transport.
3 Includes Livestock, Forestry, Fisheries, Wildlife, etc.
4 Human, Livestock, irrigation.
5 Civilian police, prisons, immigration, etc.
6 In the first column Specialised Admin, (e.g. Finance,
Planning), Other Sectoral (e.g. Industry, Commerce, Energy 
Transport and Communication) and in the Mozambican also Works, 
Agriculture and Water.
All military/para military forces - however titled - on state 
pay-roll. Nominally excludes staff National Service used as 
socialisation or training corps which should be in "Other" or 
"Education", while the enrollees should be classed as students.
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Table 5A
Restructured Public Service Employment 
Possible To End 1995
Total Civilian* 120,000 +10,000
Education/Health 60,000 + 5,000
Admin/Interior 25,000 -
Other Civilian 35,000 + 5,000
Armed Forces** 30,000 -70,000
Total Public Service 150,000 -60,000
Assumes 20,000 posts cut and 30,000 added. Up to 10,000 
employees sacked/replaced and 50,000 receiving remedial 
training.
Reduction via demobilisation of 70,000. Requires parallel
95,000 household economic rehabilitation/social reintegration 
programme for these 70,000 plus 25,000 ex-bandidos.
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Realistically a 30% increase at the bottom - to the minimum "efficiency" 
wage estimated at not less than 80% poverty line expenditure coverage - and 
50% to 100% at the top is urgently needed. How to find the $40 million 
annually needed is a question with no easy answer. Maintenance, equipment, 
mobility and operating input levels are already much too low absolutely and 
relative to staff so no re-allocation from them could be efficient. Large 
short run revenue windfalls - foreign or domestic - are unlikely; in 
contrast cloud-bursts like the extra Gulf War oil bill, the return of us to
15,000 workers from Germany and the cessation of Soviet petroleum oil are 
all too likely.
One approach would be for donors to redirect 10% to 15% of the $200 to $300 
million they spend annually on their own cooperants salaries plus the $20 
to $30 million they use to buy up Mozambique's scarcest resource. That 
would yield $40 to $75 million a year to fund a Mozambican designed and 
donor agreed incentive structure including wages and salaries, retraining 
and support for public servants' self help house construction. The effects 
on Mozambican public service capacity could be dramatic and cumulative 
reducing the 'need' for cooperants by rather more than 15%.
More broadly public service restructuring turns on reaping the peace 
dividend by demobilising 70,000 odd from the Armed Forces and 
rehabilitating their civilian livelihood prospects as well as re­
integrating them into civil society. To that 70,000 must be added 25,000 
odd ex-bandidos armados. If that can be done, the 1995 public service 
could be cut to 150,000 (versus 210,000) of which 30,000 Armed Forces 
(versus 100,000) and 120,000 civilian (versus 110,000).
The case for a rehabilitation/re-integration programme is not simply 
humanitarian (indeed for the ex-bandidos, humanitarian priorities would 
point otherwise). It is brutally pragmatic - to demobilise men with guns 
into pauperism is to ensure either an instant coup or an instant tidal wave 
of 'self help' banditry. Mozambique can afford neither. Training, an 
interim national service corps, demobilisation benefits and agricultural 
livelihood enabling programme components can be identified. So can the 
domestic finance in the longer term (defence savings). Articulated 
programmes, staff identification - training and interim finance are, at 
present, the missing components.
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Rehabilitacao Clients 1991 - 1995
Table 6
Year5 Returning
Refugees1
Returning 
Descolados/ 
Affectados2
Pauperised 
In Home 
Districts3
Demob-
ilisados4
Total
(000)
1991 250 250 250 100 850
1992 250 500 250 100 1,100
1993 250 750 250 100 1,350
1994 250 750 250 100 1,350
1995 200 750 - 50 1,000
Total 1,200 3,000 1,000 450 5,650
X Total refugees (including non-recorded, RSA , Swaziland)
perhaps 1,300, 000 - 1,400,000 •
2 Total of the order of 4,500,000 including 1former' affectados
only nominally resettled (e.g. on tiny, infertile plots) •
3 Total probably exceeds 2,000, 000 largely in Zambesia, Manica,
Nampula.
4 90,000 + 360,000 household members (70,000 Mozambique armed
forces, 20,000 ex-bandidos) .
s Timing by year is very tentative. The less the support
available the fewer the persons able to move/rehabilitate and 
the poorer the crop (e.g. 1990/91 season for 1991) the fewer 
able to move on their own and with help of relatives in
district, i.e. the higher the % of those returning needing
Rehabilitacao support.
6 Assumes "self help" rehabilitation by up to 2,500,000 persons.
Largely in Notes 2' 4‘
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Table 7
Rough Rehabilitacao Coatings; Direct Support 
and Physical Infrastructure Reconstruction 
($ 000,000 - 1990 Prices)
Direct
Support1
Infrastructure
Rehabilitation2
Admin­
istration3 Total4
1991 73 15 9 97
1992 102 34 14 150
1993 128 57 19 204
1994 131 65 20 216
1995 102 63 17 182
1 Costed at $500/household returning Year 1, $50 Year 2, $25 
Year 3. (Transport - Food - Basic Tools - Basic Inputs - 
Logistics at $50, $250, $75, $75, $50 in Year 1.)
2 Costed at $100 per household returning for 3 years. (50% wage 
payments to rehabilitacao households, 5% identification/ 
design/15% supervisory and skilled labour/10% tools/20% basic 
inputs).
3 10% of other expenditure.
4 Excludes Basic Services (including Agriculture directed to 
Sector Familial and Rural Commercial Network) except for small 
infrastructure rehabilitation.
5 Excludes interim and special training costs of demobilisation 
as well as terminal payments to demobilisees.
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Rehabilitation - Winning The Peace
The war is being won. Painful step by painful step security is returning 
to rural Mozambique - not fully, not always irreversibly but cumulatively 
and so far as the bandidos armados are concerned irreversibly. The 
prospects of peace and of a peace dividend - and, more to the point, how to 
win it, should be in the air and on the drafting boards.
Unfortunately Mozambique has been so battered for so long that exhilaration 
is still absent - partly from fear of false dawns past; partly from the 
present burdens of survival and crisis management; partly because the 
lesson learned over 1983-86 of not planning for the medium term 
economically without attention to a grim set of security constraints has 
been learned too well and too narrowly, but largely from sheer exhaustion. 
Ironically this seems almost truer of donor representatives than of 
Mozambicans especially at strategic planning level.
Mozambique has set out strategic targets summarised under the rubric return 
to the countryside. Some Ministries - notably Health - have gone far in 
elaborating, budgeting (more in a real resource than a financial sense), 
developing tactics and making a start. Others - notably Education - have 
not. In Agriculture the transformation interacts with the aborted (by war 
and resource constraints as well as donor and domestic vested interest in 
the large scale, hi-tech, hi-import, hi-cooperant enclaves) transformation 
of priority to the sector familial and with the somewhat ill-meshed twin 
goals of "building on the best" and achieving universal access. 
("Socialising the countryside" has been a mantra devoid of content for some 
years and now is rarely even incanted given the fatuity and failure of lo- 
tech communal cropping and the bureaucratic, autonomous/anarchic, 
capitalist, incompetent reality of most of the state company/donor project 
sector.)
But the core of the challenge relates to the future of the war dislocated - 
probably between 7,500,000 and 8,000,00 including refugees, dislocated 
persons in facilities, severely affected persons out of their home areas 
and wishing to return, households pauperised by war but still in their home 
areas and potential demobilisees and households. Unless these households 
can restore their livelihoods, rebuild their homes, restore their basic 
social units, the peace will be as bleak as the war - and rapidly 
disintegrate into conditions of insecurity as well as grim poverty. This
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is especially true because peace will take the febrile attention of 
emergency aid units and donors more generally away from Mozambique (witness 
the dramatic 1990 fall in Emergencia pledges) so that the end of free 
rations in deslocado and refugee camps may mean starvation not 
rejuvenation.
That is why Rehabilitacao has become a central - if very vaguely 
articulated - theme in Mozambican perspective strategic planning (which to 
date is very loosely related to the Priority Three Year Investment 
Programme planning setpiece - a fact Planning sees very clearly and is 
seeking to remedy). Of the order of 5,500,000 of the war affected persons 
can re-establish their livelihoods only with significant enabling support. 
Up to 2,500,000 may be able to do so with the help of relatives and 
neighbours (as 150,000 to 200,000 are doing in 1990). Even these will have 
much better prospect if frame basic service restoration and small scale 
infrastructure rebuilding programmes related to re-empowerment to produce 
for the 5,500,000 are achieved over 1991-95.
In broad terms the requirements are fairly clear cut:
a. transport, food until harvest, bush clearing plus cultivation plus home 
building tools, basic working capital inputs (seeds, poultry, small 
stock, household utensils) for returning or pauperised in place 
households;
b. rural works (roads, bridges, schools, clinics, small scale irrigation, 
water) restoration on a district identification, provincial works 
organised basis using labour intensive methods and organised seasonally 
to allow the returning war affected to earn cash incomes over the first 
three years before marketable surpluses above household self­
provisioning are large (or in some cases logistically moveable);
c. restoration of basic human investment (health, education, water) and 
productive (agricultural and other extension) services and of the rural 
commercial institutional and logistic infrastructure.
The first two elements do need special design, coordination and use of 
Emergencia logistical institutions notably DPCCN and Agricom. They are 
costable (at least roughly) reaching perhaps $200-225 million in their peak 
year. The real challenges are articulating, organising allocations of
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institutional and logistical capacity and restoring total Emergencia/ 
Rehabilitacao external support to the old Emergencia pledges plateau of 
$350 million a year. The third element is part of overall - largely 
recurrent - programme transformation and of strategic planning and 
articulation. That issue is recognised and is englobed in Public 
Expenditure and Public Service reviews, albeit with (as noted) very uneven 
progress to date.
The Priority District Programme - An Attempted Breakthrough
The PDP is a centre piece of Mozambican attempts to transform planning and 
policy making - to focus on production by poor people; to enable the sector 
familial; to coordinate (not integrate) different programmes using local 
civil society guidance and inter-operational unit coordination; to shift 
from isolated, hi-user cost projects - largely Capital - to broad access, 
lo-user cost programmes - largely Recurrent; to recapture design initiative 
and operational control from doadores/cooperantes and to balance the
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necessity of a breakthrough toward universality with the constraints of 
very limited resources and probably possible breadth of initial coverage at 
minimally acceptable starting quality levels. It is this set of issues as 
embodied in an initiative - and the barriers they have confronted - that is 
of more interest than the details of the PDP proposals.
First, articulation has started from district baseline data and targets 
with not insubstantial local inputs including some consultations with 
sector familial households (almost unheard of in Mozambique for officials 
or cooperantes). But it has tended - partly to please donors and partly 
from habit - to gloss over programmes (especially a Works one analogous to 
- indeed the source for - the Rehabilitacao proposals and enabling the 
largely private and co-op rural commercial network to revitalise itself) 
and to provide wodges of data on not necessarily relevant historically 
available small project proposals.
Second, data and personnel gaps are recognised (e.g. any detailed data on 
time use, budgets, gender division of each, technical practices of the 
sector familial by district or overall) but specific proposals on how to 
build a step by step programme to overcome them are lacking.
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Third, the selection of 40 Priority Districts englobing perhaps half the 
rural population has become a hard number rather than a symbol of starting 
at a manageable level (10 or 15 in year one?) and moving steadily first to 
40 (year 3?) and then on to all 128 (year 8?).
Fourth, the involvement of ministries (despite a high official level 
operational working group and leadership first from Agriculture and now 
from Planning) has been very uneven. With national and provincial macro 
and provincial and district operational coordination (not an integrated 
parallel authority) central to the PDP concept's implementation, this has 
evident risks.
Fifth, the deep distrust of cooperantes' and doadores' dominance has meant 
too few middle level, experienced articulation support professionals have 
been available with severe cost to credibility, speed, articulation and 
completeness.
Sixth, doadores have reacted in two quite different - but both basically 
unhelpful - ways. One has been to 'improve' the PDP by narrowing it to 
agriculture and to a few districts while raising intensity, cost, hi-level 
necessarily cooperantes) intensity and focus on capital and technocracy. 
Useful or no, the result is not an improved PDP but a different project.
The other has been to call for a participatory Utopia (apparently led by 
Platonic Utopian cooperant neo-Platonic Guardians, albeit the critics of 
this branch do not seem to realise this implication) and to misread the PDP 
as a hi-tech-bureaucratic parallel authority scheme rather like their own 
past agricultural sector initiatives in Mozambique rather than as an 
attempted transformation based in large measure on Mozambican reaction 
against them.
Seventh, Mozambique's decision taking capacity and flexibility far out­
strips its professional, let alone bureaucratic and administrative, back­
up. As a result a coherent strategic initiative concept paper on the PDP 
was presented at the 1989 Consultative Group meeting. A relatively weak 
first draft articulated (partial) programme paper did not appear until 
March 1990 and neither effective response to either branch of doadores 
critique nor a strengthening of the March paper had progressed far by late 
1990.
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One way forward might be to concentrate on the simpler and more desperately 
urgent Rehabilitacao over 1991-92 and - using the time gained and the 
experience of Rehabilitacao - to refine and articulate PDP for a 1993-2001 
launch/build-up to 128 districts. The danger in that is perpetuation of 
the present pattern of large, largely irrelevant uses of external resources 
and domestic policy attention on a handful of ultimately largely rather 
irrelevant (to most Mozambicans or to overall production in this century) 
showpiece, isolated projects and to reinforce the power of the 
bureaucracies and technocracies, whose empires they are as well as their 
symbiotic linkages with interested doadores, technocrats and salesmen (of 
ideas as well as goals. As these Mozambican-External enclaves are major 
barriers to coordinated strategic decision taking, a coherent planning and 
policy process, or any acceptable (from Mozambican national goal 
perspectives) resource allocation pattern, that cost is not trivial.
Beyond Agriculture: Wages, Employment and Productivity
Because in 1986 when Economic and Social Reconstruction Programming began 
only urban Mozambique plus perhaps a quarter of rural was secure, economic 
rehabilitation to date has focused on the non-agricultural and, in effect, 
urban economy. Rehabilitacao and PDP would mark a break with that history 
but would not reduce the importance of the urban and non-agricultural 
sectors. Indeed, by restoring their hinterlands, markets and sources of 
supply to these sectors they should make their recovery faster and less 
difficult.
Enabling absolutely poor urban households to earn enough to escape from 
that state and averting vulnerable households from being plunged into it 
depends primarily on the interaction between formal employment levels and 
the real minimum wage and secondarily on the number and productivity of 
artisanal, agricultural (Zonas Verdes Plot linked) and other "informal" 
employment/self-employment opportunities. The two interact because while 
up to 80% of urban Mozambican households have at least one formal sector 
job (about 20%, at least in Maputo, have two) virtually all also have other 
sources of income and need them to achieve socially acceptable consumption 
financeability.
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From 1987 the real minimum wage (salario minimale) has - as a matter of 
policy - been held at two-thirds the absolute poverty line for a household 
of 5 or 6 (even though the link is not expressed in that precise form). If 
it fell - as it did for some months in 1988 - the numbers in absolute 
poverty would rise sharply. As there is little reason to suppose a lower 
real wage would result in lower unit of output labour costs (i.e. real cost 
per worker would be offset by lower productivity - or higher klepsi klepsi 
- per worker) there is no cost efficiency or employment expansion argument 
of much significance against this socially crucial position.
Formal sector employment expansion prospects are poor. Given undercapacity 
past and present operations and the need to restructure a number of large 
enterprises (not all public), a 6% urban economy growth rate is unlikely to 
generate more than a 1% to 2% net recorded employment expansion. If labour 
intensity is built into projects (as it is being in the World Bank financed 
urban renewal project at least in respect to street rehabilitation) and 
programmes (as it has been in the restart of Maputo City sanitation/rubbish 
collection) that might bring the growth of formal sector urban employment 
to 3% to 4% - barely adequate to hold the ratio of recorded wage employed 
to households constant.
The one very successful informal sector programme is that of Zonas Verdes 
(which are also particularly enabling for women and female-headed 
households). Originally designed to provide staple food self-provisioning 
plots, these are - as the economy, food availability and access to rural 
areas recover - converting themselves into market gardening areas with 
growing self-organised co-op roles. Both nao salario and large salario 
minimale households with productive plots are likely to be able to stay 
above the absolute poverty line - at least in Maputo.
The balance of the informal sector is characterised by lack of homogeneity, 
lack of data and lack (partly consequential, partly inherent) of known 
operational means to help enable it to expand. The return of security will 
help because artisanal informal sectors in SSA do depend on contact with 
their rural hinterlands which has been severely constrained since 1982 in 
Mozambique. What other factors actually constrain artisans and other micro 
enterprises are not known - tools? Inputs? Particular skills? Working 
capital? Actually enforced (as opposed to unenforced rule-book) 
regulations? The first steps to a programme seem likely to need to be
31
The problems are personnel (especially retraining or replacing many present 
post holders), finance and fees. The last at present do not yield 
significant revenue but do lead to significant access and administration 
problems (the inverse of their advocates vision!). Whether more flexible, 
community linked resource mobilisation - now being experimented with in 
respect to community health worker (APE) re-establishment and to be 
experimented with in respect to standpipe (fontenario) water provision to 
non-high rise (canico or canissa) zones of Maputo - will enable such fund 
raising from users to be part of the answer - as opposed to an additional, 
and largely self-inflicted part of the problem - remains to be seen.
For the recorded employment sector, a relatively standard and potentially 
relatively adequate social security (retirement, disability, illness) 
mechanism is being put in place. Beyond that, few more safety net 
additions appear practicable except, perhaps, specialised national or local 
Mozambican (or foreign) NGO led and financed ones. Mozambique has enough 
concern to give priority to providing resources intended to ensure decent 
survival safety nets. Beyond making these work better, neither the 
financial, the data base, the institutional nor the personnel can be made 
available in the foreseeable future. Or as one not unsympathetic but 
exasperated professional has put it in response to well intended 
conceptualizations toward a complex, flexible, caring, dense safety network 
on North European lines, "Maputo is not Malmo".
Doadores and Cooperantes: Decapacitating Driving or Fuelling Capacitation?
Mozambique - including its state and public services - cannot survive 
without massive (absolutely and relative to total resources) external 
support plus substantial numbers of middle and high level expatriate 
personnel. But the ways in which these have come to be provided 
decapacitates the state and removes operational responsibility for/control 
over large chunks of the public sector from Mozambican hands. This is a 
recipe for mutual frustration and for collapse when external supporters 
become tired of the perpetual dependence and decapacitation, which, their 
own approaches now ensure, and withdraw or sharply reduce their financial 
and personnel inputs.
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The problem does not turn primarily on will to dominate - albeit Platonic 
Guardianship is an omnipresent subliminal ideology of most donors (and most 
development studies analysts!), however much they try to curb it. However, 
the facts of financial dependence and limited numbers of first rate 
strategic designers and negotiators raise the danger of domination even 
when not desired by donors. Nor is the problem basically donor self- 
interest - in exports of goods or people. That is a uniform factor not 
special to Mozambique and while inefficient (if development by the 
recipient, however defined, is the main goal) is usually containable. Nor 
is it sheer numbers of cooperantes - 3,000 strictly defined or 5,000 
including other high level expatriates Botswana has at times had almost as 
many absolutely and over ten times as many but has kept firm Botswanan 
control over strategy, policy and public sector operations.
The basic roots are partly historic and partly relative strengths. In high 
and middle level personnel, independent Mozambique inherited perhaps a 
tenth of the already low numbers in colonial Mozambique. Both in respect 
to professionals and managers/administrators it needed an abnormally high 
initial proportion of expatriates. So long as they appeared to "do the 
job" there was a tendency to let them operate virtually autonomously 
without adequate briefing, guidance or ongoing accountability. With the 
war emergency adding to tasks to be done and training/retraining proceeding 
less rapidly than anticipated, this tendency mushroomed. To "get the job 
done" donors acted - often with full Mozambican approval - on their own or 
through units only nominally within or accountable to the Mozambican 
decision taking process and still less to Mozambican public servants. This 
came to be true even of cooperantes apparently in units within governmental 
agencies. Aggravating this trend was the rising dependence on external 
funding. On the one hand it led to cooperantes and senior Mozambican 
public servants going directly to doadores for support, by-passing 
Mozambican decision taking and resource allocating channels and presenting 
(often welcome) faits accomplis when their requests were met. In addition 
it weakened Mozambique's ability either to say no to unwelcome proposals 
deemed (often with reason) to be unsound or to reject amendments viewed 
(often with reason) to distort the intent of Mozambican proposals.
A particularly damaging set of developments lie in direct grants to 
projects (preventing any budgetary transparency or coherent resource 
allocation) and enforcement of multiple, external reporting procedures on
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foreign finance (given scarce accounting and reporting talent, totally 
preventing establishment of functioning national budgeting/financial 
control/reporting/planning systems).
The diagnosis may help identify steps toward treatment:
1. Place cooperantes primarily in Mozambican run institutions regularly 
reporting and accountable to Mozambicans (at managerial and 
professional, not just Ministerial, levels) in fact as well as form;
2. Phase cooperantes out of line posts and into support services, training 
and professional advisory ones as rapidly as feasible;
3. Redress the "have a headache? Take two expatriates!" syndrome without 
falling into its mirror image "have a pain in the neck? Take/push two 
expatriates out!" Less cooperantes, a different make-up of posts, more 
accountability to Mozambicans and more Mozambican involvement in 
selection are needed, but not generalised pro- or anti-cooperante 
premises which provide little appropriate guidance in any specific 
case;
4. Serious concentration on supporting training (including retraining) of 
Mozambicans on the basis of Mozambican designed and articulated 
requirements in Mozambique. (Overseas training by ones and twos cannot 
in most cases meet needs at manageable costs and is, in any event, not 
suitable for retraining while continuing on the job.);
5. Accepting an agreed single Mozambican accounting and 
reporting/monitoring framework for all external inputs (as part of a 
national planning-budgeting-accounting-monitoring frame) with 
conversion to doadores' preferred formats (including supplementary data 
collection) their responsibility;
6. Greater readiness by doadores and cooperantes to accept that 
Mozambicans do know a great deal about Mozambique which outsiders do 
not and of the wisdom of the Duke of Wellington's standard observation 
both as a military and political commander, "I may very well be wrong".
To state the Bteps is also to show the difficulties of taking them. A host 
of external and domestic vested interests do, and will continue to oppose 
them. Many of the present relationships are convenient and - in a short
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term sense - do work. The changes in styles of doing business and in 
outlook a more capacitating, cooperating, Mozambican centred approach would 
require of Mozambicans as well as of their partners would be major, painful 
and, at first, uncertainty and transitional cost generating.
The hypothesis that Northern NGO's are able to avoid the patterns cited 
does not, in general, hold up in Mozambique. They are, in practice, even 
harder to coordinate within any overall Mozambican framework and even more 
prone - with a few exceptions - to by-pass their Mozambican NGO and civil 
society counterparts than governmental agencies are to by-pass the 
Mozambican government. The problem of imbalance of financial and personnel 
resources may be less at NGO-State level but is, if anything, even greater 
at Northern NGO-Mozambican NGO, civil society body or decentralised 
government unit levels. NGOs may well be part of the answer, but only if 
it is recognised that they are today a not insignificant part of the 
problem.
Poverty, Rehabilitation, Capacity and Governance
Mozambique's political system has held up surprisingly well in the face of 
war and both economic and security unsuccess over the past decade.
Interest and participation - doubtless especially, but not only, in towns 
and among those who are not absolutely poor - was again demonstrated in the 
processes leading to the 1989 Party Conference and the 1990 adoption of a 
new Constitution.
But that success could very well crumble at the onset of peace - if 
capacity to restore livelihoods and basic services does not increase fairly 
rapidly. During the war decade, the failures of the government (by 
omission or even commission) could, not unreasonably, be seen as the result 
of South Africa's "total onslaught" via its bandidos armados. As such they 
had limited general (as opposed to for some social groups and in some rural 
areas) corrosive impact on acceptance or support of the state at least in 
the sense of creating active opposition. But they did lead to lower 
expectations, a sense of fatalism and withdrawal (or isolation) from the 
government and the political process on a far wider level. Unless the 
ability of the state and the public services to deliver can be, and be seen 
to be, growing again that tendency of withdrawal will grow rapidly and will
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seek alternatives in the political realm to what it sees as a broken 
backed, discredited by non-results state and public service.
Thus in Mozambique the purely professional and technical aspects of better 
governance are of prime importance. The professional capacity to account 
is at least as much a gross limitation on accountability as the various 
routes of escape from accountability more commonly highlighted. And in 
rural areas ability to deliver livelihood rehabilitation support, basic 
services and infrastructure rehabilitation plus a functioning commercial 
network will count for more than the degree of autonomy of Districts from 
Provinces or the exact procedures for electing Popular Councils/Assemblies 
at either level.
Mozambique is one of a group of SSA states with relatively participatory, 
relatively public interest and poor majority oriented states/governments 
with a record of - at best - very limited economic and social success and 
very constrained government operational (human, institutional and 
financial) capacity. In them there is a very real danger of some form of 
cargo cult populism winning broad support. It is likely to be an alliance 
of elites who are very market (meaning in practice markets manipulated by 
them) oriented, despairing trade unionists, excluded absolutely poor people 
hoping for a chance and exclusivist nationalists reacting against what they 
perceive as doadores/cooperantes and minority (citizen) community rule.
The degree of actual priority to poverty reduction is likely to be very low 
and the apparent high respect for technocrats to be either in quite limited 
roles or neo-corporatist. Given the inherent contradictions in the 
alliance components' interests, the desire to be seen to change things, the 
unchanged capacity limits on the government/public sector and the probable 
alienation of external cooperating partners, the results are unlikely to be 
particularly happy for most Africans.
The problematic is not one primarily of broad church, relatively internally 
competitive single (or permanently governing) versus multi party systems. 
The cargo cult populist potential can win power in either, albeit for 
historic reasons it is sometimes (e.g. Zambia, Tanzania) associated with 
multi party advocacy. For that matter in less open systems, it could form 
the basis or the rationalisation for a coup (one reading of the Doe 
regime's coming to power). It is very much one of capacity to deliver. 
Non-success is never permanently politically saleable and an untested
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alternative cannot by its nature be proven ex ante to be decapacitating by 
a political leadership with (for whatever reason) a demonstratable record 
of low capacity to deliver.
Some Reflections on Contextual and General
Mozambique does illustrate the pitfalls of articulating and applying 
specifics without grounding in contextual frames. But that, perhaps, is 
already becoming conventional wisdom at least at analytical and senior 
policy maker levels.
What may be more interesting is the recurrence of several organising 
principles and themes which are hardly new to development thinking but have 
tended to fall out of fashion:
1. public finance and especially allocation patterns;
2. public service numbers and make-up;
3. coherence and coordination in analysis, decision taking and 
articulating action;
4. enabling poor people to produce more and to have access to the 
supporting services needed to do so (Robert Macnamara's "absolute 
poverty eradication" and the ILO's "basic needs/"employment" focuses 
revisited);
5. security (law and order is not sufficient for development but its 
absence is sufficient to ensure disintegration);
6. the importance of rapid post war rehabilitation (the Marshall Plan, 
broadly defined, including its European initiatives and operational 
decision taking, revisited);
7. the need for any government to have a capacity to deliver if its 
political system is to prove viable (the technical, albeit not the 
political/inegalitarian, half of the "development state" dialogue and 
the "public administration" focus revisited).
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Main Sources
A. Mozambique Government Publications/Working Papers
Plano Trienal de Investimento Publico (PTIP), Comissao Naciunal do 
Plano, Maputo 1990
Programa dos Distritos Prioritarios (PDP) - First Draft - CNP, Maputo 
1990
A Probreza em Mozambique, Prime Minister's Office, Maputo, 1989 
(Working Group Report prepared by R. H. Green)
The Emergency Situation in Mozambique; Priority Requirements for Period 
1990-91, Mozambique/UNDP, Maputo/New York, 1990
The Situation of Children and Women in Mozambique, Ministry of Co- 
Operation/UNICEF, 1990
Strategy and Program for Economic Rehabilitation 1989-92, Mozambique, 
Maputo 1989
Africa Conference (July 1990, Limburg, Netherlands) Speech by Minister 
of Finance Abdul Magid Osman
B . UNICEF Publications/Working Papers
Children On The Front Line, New York, 1987 and 1990
R. Morgan and R. H. Green, "A Peace Dividend For The Children Of The 
Frontline? Pointers From Namibia", Windhoek, 1990, mimeo
C. World Bank Reports
Mozambique Food Security Study, Washington, D.C., 1989
Mozambique Population, Health and Nutrition Sector Report, Washington, 
D.C., 1990
Public Expenditure Review Report, Washington, D.C., 1990
D . Other
R. H. Green, "Toward Rural Reconstruction In Mozambique", paper 
presented at Agricultural Economics Association of Namibia/ 
International Association of Agricultural Economists Regional 
Conference, Swakopmund, Namibia, 1990
M. Santos Neves, "Agricultural Policy And Strategy Of Support To The 
Family Subsector in Mozambique", MPhil Thesis, University of Sussex, 
1990
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa/UN Inter-Agency Task 
Force, Africa Recovery Programme, South African Destabilization: The 
Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid, New York, 1989
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In one sense the reappearance of these "old friends" is reassuring. It 
does imply that - given proper contextual and historical grounding - there 
are tools for analysing, conceptualising and acting to reduce Mozambique's 
problems and, at least in part, to rise to meet the challenges facing its 
government and people. In a different sense it is much less reassuring.
The need to "rediscover" results from the exceedingly fashion conscious 
nature not only of development studies (which might or might not matter) 
but also of development practice. The new is rarely added to the old but 
replaces it; a new grand design is usually preferred to refining the old.
As a result, knowledge, experience and capacity tend to become sequential, 
not cumulative - possibly not the pattern most likely to be conducive to 
sustainable development. Least of all are fashion oriented overswings and 
returns likely to help build up capacity in a context of institutional 
fragility, knowledge and personnel scarcity and financial/foreign exchange 
constraint. Perhaps Alfred Marshall's dicta that nature makes haste slowly 
and that the failure of hot aspiration leads to cold reaction have more 
relevance to development processes than has usually been supposed.
